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Research demonstrates that social preferences are characterized by significant individual
differences. An important question, often overlooked, is from where do these individual
differences originate? And what are the processes that underlie such differences? In
this paper, we outline the neural trait approach to uncovering sources of individual
differences in social preferences, particularly as evidenced in economic games. We
focus on two primary methods—resting-state electroencephalography and structural
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)—used by researchers to quantify task-independent,
brain-based characteristics that are stable over time. We review research that has
employed these methods to investigate social preferences with an emphasis on a key
psychological process in social decision-making; namely, self-control. We then highlight
future opportunities for the neural trait approach in cutting-edge decision-making research.
Finally, we explore the debate about self-control in social decision-making and the potential
role neural trait research could play in this issue.
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INTRODUCTION
People display a rich variety of heterogeneity in social preferences.
However, individual differences in social preferences are in need
of further elucidation, as the field transitions from description
to explanation of such heterogeneity (Apicella et al., 2010).
Explaining differences in social preferences can deepen our under-
standing of social decision-making processes and uncover ways
to promote more prosocial behaviors. There are key questions
to answer. From where do these striking differences in social
preferences originate? And once these sources are revealed, what
can be inferred about the psychological processes that lead to such
individual differences?
We contend that the neural trait approach holds distinct
promise in answering these questions. A neural trait can be
defined as a quantifiable brain-based characteristic that is sta-
ble over time and capable of influencing preferences or behav-
ior. In this article, we detail the neural trait approach to
uncovering sources of individual differences in social prefer-
ences, particularly as evidenced in economic games. The next
section outlines the neural trait approach. The third section
highlights contemporary studies across a range of behaviors
that have used the neural trait approach to explore hetero-
geneity in social decision-making. The fourth section outlines
future opportunities for the neural trait approach in cutting-
edge decision-making research. For example, recent studies
sought to uncover divergent motives behind identical behavior
through novel combinations of economic games. Further, theo-
rizing about self-control processes in social decision-making is
at a crossroads and neural traits may help inform the current
debate.
THE NEURAL TRAIT APPROACH
The neural trait approach described here involves indexing brain-
based characteristics and examining whether these indices pre-
dict behavior in decision-making or processes directly relevant
to decision-making. This achieves two respective goals. The
first goal is (obviously) to determine sources of behavioral het-
erogeneity. Decision-making models usually describe aggregate
behavior; yet people evidence quite divergent behavior, even
in identical situations (Scheres and Sanfey, 2006; Wischniewski
et al., 2009; Levallois et al., 2012). Neural traits are well
suited to capture this variance in decision-making (Nash and
Knoch, 2015). The second goal is to add a level of analysis
that supplements and is informed by task-dependent analy-
ses of neural and psychological processes (Berkman and Falk,
2013). Based on prior literature of neural functioning, neural
traits can help researchers infer why differences in decision-
making may occur. We do note that inferring the psycho-
logical mechanism is more suitable when a brain region has
been tightly linked to a theoretically relevant function. We
also note that because the measurement of neural traits can
involve examining the entire brain, the probability of detecting
a specious relationship should be controlled for by multiple test
correction.
How is a neural trait indexed, then? We hold that an effective
neural trait measure should meet two criteria. First, to capture
stable differences the neural trait must itself be stable, e.g., the
measure should demonstrate high test-retest reliability. Second,
the measure should be unique or specific to that individual, or
highly capable of disassociating people based on the neural trait
measure, much like a neural “fingerprint”.
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We focus on two measures that fulfill these criteria. The
first is resting-state electroencephalography (resting-state EEG).
Measuring resting-state EEG involves recording electrical activity
from the brain on the scalp when the participant is at rest
to index patterns of brain activity that are not related to any
particular task. Power values for different frequency bands are
derived from the resting-state EEG in most neural trait research.
In fulfillment of the first criterion of neural trait measurement,
these frequency-based measures of resting-state EEG activity are
relatively stable in the adult brain. They demonstrate test–retest
reliabilities of up to 0.8 over a period of 5 years (Dünki et al.,
2000; Näpflin et al., 2007), are heritable (estimates ranging from
70–96% heritability; see Zietsch et al., 2007; Smit et al., 2008;
van’t Ent et al., 2009; de Geus, 2010), and are unique to the
individual (i.e., it is possible to predict who the individual is
based on the particular pattern of EEG activity—at up to a 99%
recognition rate; Dünki et al., 2000; Näpflin et al., 2007). Thus,
resting-state EEG can reliably capture dispositional differences in
neural functioning.
Structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of brain
anatomy is the second neural trait measure discussed here.
Neuroanatomical differences can be quantified by measuring
high-resolution images of gray-matter and white-matter. Gray-
matter approaches typically quantify cortical and subcortical vol-
ume, thickness, or surface area (Ashburner and Friston, 2000),
and white-matter approaches quantify features of the neural
connections in the brain (Basser, 1995). These approaches are
motivated by the assumption that brain anatomy differences
reflect functional differences (Boyke et al., 2008; DeYoung et al.,
2010). Cortical volume (i.e., the combination of cortical thickness
and surface area) is highly stable in the adult brain (Han et al.,
2006; DeYoung et al., 2010) and heritable (estimates ranging from
75%–90% heritability; Thompson et al., 2001; Panizzon et al.,
2009). White-matter outcome variables have also demonstrated
excellent test-retest reliability (Büchel et al., 2004) and are highly
heritable (estimates from 75–90% heritability; Chiang et al.,
2009). Like resting-state EEG, then, structural MRI measures are
ideal for quantifying brain-based individual differences (Kanai
and Rees, 2011).
Additionally, both resting-state EEG and structural MRI mea-
sures relate to neural and psychological functioning. For example,
higher power values in delta, theta, and alpha EEG frequency
bands (i.e., slower-wave frequency bands) tend to be associated
with decreased cortical activation, whereas higher power values
in beta tend to be associated with increased cortical activation
(Cook et al., 1998; Laufs et al., 2003; Oakes et al., 2004). Similarly,
cortical differences in volume indicate differences in neuronal
populations and thereby reflect different functioning or process-
ing capacity in that region (Boyke et al., 2008; DeYoung et al.,
2010). Put simply, more cortical volume is generally thought
to indicate better functioning. Thus, both neural trait measures
are associated with neural functioning, providing an “online”
mechanism that can connect stable brain differences to social
behavior.
Neural traits also predict functioning in apposite psychological
processes. For example, increased resting-state EEG activity in
the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) is associated with superior
response inhibition (Schiller et al., 2013), consistent with the lat-
eral PFC’s reliably demonstrated role in cognitive control (Miller
and Cohen, 2001; Aron et al., 2003; Kerns et al., 2004; Knoch
et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2009; Cohen and Lieberman, 2010).
Increased cortical volume in the same brain region is similarly
associated with various measures of cognitive control (Yuan and
Raz, 2014). As such, neural traits involving the lateral PFC might
reflect differences in cognitive control capacity. However, we
wish to mention that research demonstrating the neural and
psychological mechanisms that underlie the links between neural
traits and social decision-making behaviors is in incipient stages.
Below, we highlight several key findings that not only demonstrate
how neural traits can explain the sources of heterogeneity in
social decision-making but also empirically indicate potential
mechanisms.
NEURAL TRAIT RESEARCH: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN
SOCIAL DECISION-MAKING BEHAVIOR
Research shows that people demonstrate significant individual
differences in cooperative behavior (Kurzban and Houser, 2001),
in the rejection of unfair offers (Güth, 1995; Roth, 1995), and in
altruistic responding (Andreoni and Miller, 2002). However, gen-
der, economic status, age, and education have difficulty explaining
sources of individual differences in social behavior (Camerer,
2003; Henrich et al., 2006). Self-report measures used to explain
social preferences also carry certain limitations. Self-report is
susceptible to various sources of bias, including socially desir-
able responding, random responding, and demand characteristics
(Edwards, 1957; Nichols and Maner, 2008). Further, completing
questionnaires that make certain preferences more salient may
alter behavior in a subsequent economic game. Conversely, first
completing an economic game may alter responding on subse-
quent questionnaires.
As an alternative method, neural traits are objectively indexed,
free from personal biases and demand characteristics. Moreover,
they can be measured remotely from behaviors. Thus, behavioral
performance is left unadulterated by the act of completing neu-
ral trait measures and vice versa. In this section, we examine
research from a diverse sampling of behaviors that fit under the
neural trait approach, with a focus on social decision-making
behavior.
DECEPTION
Deception is a social behavior that appears to involve cogni-
tive control as one must deliver a convincing fabrication and
simultaneously inhibit the truth (Abe, 2011). Consistent with
this, deception reliably engages the lateral PFC (Abe et al.,
2007; Sip et al., 2008). However, heterogeneity in the propen-
sity to deceive is poorly understood (Kashy and DePaulo, 1996;
Gino and Pierce, 2009). For example, self-report measures of
personality traits tend to demonstrate low predictive power of
deception (DePaulo, 2004). To address this gap in research
using the neural trait approach, Baumgartner et al. (2013a)
used a modified trust game to index self-initiated deception
and separately measured task-independent resting-state EEG.
In the modified trust game, participants played with a part-
ner. Prior to an investment phase, participants signaled to
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their partner how likely they were to return an investment of
money. After the partner transferred money to the participant,
they could then make a decision; honor their promise and
return the money, or break that trust and keep everything. A
whole-brain correlational analysis revealed a surprising find-
ing. In contrast to prior research demonstrating lateral PFC
involvement, increased deception was associated with reduced
resting-state activation in the anterior insula. The anterior
insula is associated with emotional awareness and, in particular,
awareness of negative emotions like guilt and shame (Craig,
2009). Baumgartner et al. investigated this by examining par-
ticipants’ self-reported emotions. They found that increased
resting-state activation in the anterior insula also predicted
increased negative affect. Thus, these results suggest that peo-
ple with heightened resting-state insula activity may be predis-
posed towards honesty because a hyperactive emotional system
could make a deceptive act too aversive. More broadly, these
results are a compelling example of the power of the neural
trait approach. The implementation of a behavior (e.g., decep-
tion via the lateral PFC) can be separated from sources of
individual differences in that behavior (e.g., heterogeneity in
deception is explained by resting-state activity in the anterior
insula).
INTERGROUP BIAS IN INTERGROUP RELATIONS
Increasingly, attention has turned to whether neural traits can
explain social preferences in intergroup behavior (Cikara and
Van Bavel, 2014), such as those related to egalitarianism and
prejudice. Personality measures have been relatively poor pre-
dictors of heterogeneity in intergroup bias (Hewstone et al.,
2002). Baumgartner et al. (2013b) recognized the need for
objective measurement in explaining intergroup bias and thus
examined anatomical differences in the brain. They used struc-
tural MRI to measure neuroanatomy and measured impar-
tiality with the third-party punishment game. In this game,
participants are offered the opportunity to punish both ingroup
and outgroup transgressors, though administering such punish-
ment costs money. Results demonstrated that increased dorso-
medial PFC volume and (to a lesser extent) temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ) volume were associated with increased impar-
tiality. Both the dorsomedial PFC and the TPJ have been
strongly linked to perspective-taking processes—recognizing
another person’s thoughts, emotions, and goals (Adolphs, 2003;
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009; Young et al.,
2010). Based on this, Baumgartner et al. explored perspective-
taking as a potential psychological mechanism. They asked
participants to rate the degree to which they were able to
perspective-take with in-group and out-group members. They
found that perspective-taking mediated the association between
dorsomedial PFC volume and impartiality. That is, partici-
pants with increased dorsomedial PFC volume used perspective-
taking more equally for ingroup and outgroup members, and
this more equal use of perspective-taking predicted increased
impartiality. Together, these results demonstrate that anatomi-
cal differences in a distributed perspective-taking network can
explain sources of individual differences in egalitarianism. Fur-
ther, these results demonstrate how neural traits may predict
social behavior through a theoretically integral psychological
process.
INDIRECT RECIPROCAL BEHAVIOR
People help strangers, even if helping carries a cost and there
is no expectation of direct reciprocation (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003). However, the cost of helping can be defrayed by receiv-
ing someone else’s assistance in future interaction (Nowak
and Sigmund, 2005). Watanabe et al. (2014) examined het-
erogeneity in this so-called “indirect reciprocity” by using
both functional and structural MRI. Their goal was to tease
apart two types of indirect reciprocity; reputation-based (gain
a good reputation by reciprocating cooperative behavior) and
pay-it-forward (help another after being helped themselves).
In terms of the neural trait results, Watanabe et al. (2014)
found that increased reputation-based reciprocity was associ-
ated with increased precuneus volume and that increased pay-
it-forward reciprocity was associated with increased anterior
insula volume. This is consistent with the “online” functional
results. Increased reputation-based reciprocity was also asso-
ciated with increased activity in the precuneus and increased
pay-it-forward reciprocity was associated with increased activ-
ity in the anterior insula. Broadly, this supports the notion
that neural traits relate to social behavior through func-
tional differences. More specifically, because the precuneus has
been linked to self-centered cognition and the anterior insula
has been linked to emotional awareness (Craig, 2009) and
affective empathy (Singer et al., 2004), the authors inferred
that individual differences in self-centered cognition might
explain differences in reputation-based reciprocity and indi-
vidual differences in affective empathy might explain differ-
ences in pay-it-forward reciprocity. Future research should
directly probe the degree to which these potential psycho-
logical processes mediate the effect of cortical volume in the
precuneus and anterior insula on these separate forms of
reciprocity.
COSTLY PUNISHMENT BEHAVIOR
People readily enforce norms, such as the fairness norm, by
delivering punishment, even at a personal cost (Fehr and Gächter,
2002). Perhaps because such behavior requires sacrifice, costly
punishment behavior is characterized by significant variation
across individuals (Herrmann et al., 2008). Findings from the
few attempts to explain sources of such behavioral heterogeneity
have been mixed, however. Gender, income, wealth, and edu-
cation have low predictive power that varies strongly according
to the idiosyncrasies of the different study designs (Camerer,
2003). On the other hand, up to 40% of variation in costly
punishment behavior can be attributed to genetic components
(Wallace et al., 2007), yet hinting that stable and objective dis-
positional differences might be uniquely capable of explaining
heterogeneity in costly punishment. Based on this reasoning,
Knoch et al. (2010) measured resting-state EEG activity and
costly punishment behavior in the ultimatum game. In this
game, participants were put in the role of a responder, instructed
to reject or accept proposed divisions of real money from a
different player (the proposer). A rejection ensures that both
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parties get no money. Thus the responder can punish the pro-
poser for unfair offers, but at a personal cost. A whole-brain
correlational analysis revealed that approximately 50% of the
variance in costly punishment was predicted by resting-state
activity in the right dorsolateral PFC. It is well established that
the lateral PFC is involved in implementing cognitive- and self-
control processes (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Aron et al., 2003;
Kerns et al., 2004; Knoch et al., 2006; Cohen and Lieberman,
2010). Moreover, costly punishment conflicts with economic self-
interest, suggesting that enacting costly punishment requires self-
control to overcome the selfish impulse to make money. Based
on these considerations, the authors inferred that resting-state
activity in the lateral PFC might reflect self-control capacity.
Differences in this capacity could thus explain why people differ
in costly punishment. This is an explanation that is ripe for direct
investigation.
ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR
Defined broadly as behavior that benefits another individual or
group at a personal cost to the actor (Camerer, 2003; Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich et al., 2006), altruism has been found
to have significant, yet difficult to explain individual differences.
Andreoni and Miller (2002), for example, found three hetero-
geneous groups in a modified dictator game; a selfish group, a
strategic group, and a fair group. However, characteristics such as
sex, wealth, age, and education are poor predictors of individual
differences in altruistic behavior (Camerer, 2003; Henrich et al.,
2006). Morishima et al. (2012) applied the neural trait approach
and used structural MRI to examine if cortical volume might
better explain such differences. They expected that anatomical
differences in the TPJ and perspective-taking capacity might play
a role. Heterogeneity in altruistic behavior was captured from
proposals in a dictator game and responses in a reciprocity
game. Compared to the ultimatum game, the recipient of the
proposal in the dictator game can’t exact punishment, so the
proposer acts with impunity. Results showed that increased TPJ
volume was associated with increased altruistic behavior (i.e., give
money to a partner at a personal cost), particularly when the
participant was positioned advantageously to the game partner
(Morishima et al., 2012). Further, TPJ volume predicted the cost
that each individual was willing to pay for an altruistic act, and
this individual-specific cost was associated with functional acti-
vation in the TPJ during an altruistic act. Thus, neuroanatomical
differences in brain structure can explain differences in altruistic
behavior and functional activity in the TPJ during altruistic
behavior.
FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NEURAL TRAIT APPROACH
Research in social decision-making is shifting from simple
description to explanation of individual differences (Apicella
et al., 2010). We hold, and have hopefully demonstrated in our
review, that neural traits can play a significant role in uncovering
the sources of these individual differences in decision-making
processes and behavior. In the next section, we explore nascent
opportunities for the neural trait approach in social decision-
making research. First, neural traits can play a role in recent
efforts to more precisely determine heterogeneity in behavior
by examining behavior across multiple types of games. Second,
neural traits can inform the ongoing debate about the role of self-
control in social decision-making.
THE NEURAL TRAIT APPROACH AND MULTIPLE ECONOMIC GAMES
Cited as a “great success” in decision-making research, economic
games have provided researchers with the necessary tools to
formalize models that explain significant deviations from self-
interested behavior and the prototype of Homo economicus (see
Fehr and Krajbich, 2013). Recent findings highlight another
emerging research opportunity. The meaning or motives behind
certain behaviors in economic games have been hotly contested.
A single economic game played with one-shot interactions can
reveal individual differences in cooperative behavior. But why
are people cooperative in that game? Is there only one motive
driving behavior for all people? Or can people be coopera-
tive for different reasons? Whereas multiple economic games
have been employed primarily to examine behavioral consistency
(Yamagishi et al., 2013; Peysakhovich et al., 2014), adminis-
tering multiple games to the same participant can also allow
the researcher to isolate within-person motives to more pre-
cisely demonstrate the nature of these social decisions (Brañas-
Garza et al., 2014). Research that used this methodology has
revealed that the same behavior (e.g., cooperative behavior) is
often multi-determined and can be attributed to entirely different
motives.
As an example of this multiple game methodology, Yamagishi
et al. (2012) tested whether costly punishment in the UG reflects
a preference for fairness. They found that this behavior did not
correlate with fairness-related behavior in prisoner’s dilemma,
trust, and dictator games. Yamagishi et al. (2012) surmised that
costly punishment was driven by social-status concerns. Brañas-
Garza et al. (2014) also used multiple games to examine whether
costly punishment in the UG reflects a benevolent tit-for-tat
strategy (i.e., fairness), as is commonly assumed, or a spiteful
riposte to an insulting offer. These researchers focused on peo-
ple who rejected unfair offers in the UG and examined their
behavior as proposer in the DG. Two groups emerged. One
group proposed fair offers and another group proposed unfair
offers in the DG (Brañas-Garza et al., 2014). For this latter
group, purely selfish monetary gain is not the driving motive,
hence the rejection of money, nor is fairness, hence the unfair
proposal in the DG. Rather, these people appear to reject unfair
offers purely out of spite. Thus, evidence for both fairness and
spitefulness motives were found, though amongst separate groups
of people.
The use of multiple economic games to characterize het-
erogeneity in decision-making has even been used recently to
isolate the elusive Homo economicus—a model of behavior in
which the person maximizes personal gain with no regard for
others. Yamagishi et al. (2014) had participants play as second
mover in the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) and proposer in
the DG, behaviors that should cleanly reveal either selfish or
prosocial preferences. They focused on two selfish groups. One
group, aptly termed Homo economicus (comprising 7% of the
sample), always kept their money in the PDG and DG. Another
group, termed quasi-Homo economicus (comprising 8.7% of
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the sample), were nearly as selfish, though they gave money
to their playing partner a small fraction of the time. Further,
based on personality profiles, the authors reasoned that the
Homo economicus group appeared more rational, whereas the
quasi-Homo economicus group appeared intuitive (Yamagishi
et al., 2014).
Thus, administering multiple games to the same individuals
can better describe individual differences, particularly amongst
people who evidence the same behavior in a single game.
However, the sources of such differences remain unexplained.
Neural traits are ideally positioned to explain these more fine-
grained motives and preferences. In studies that administer sev-
eral games, it is particularly critical that neural traits can be
measured separately and objectively from social behavior, con-
trolling for bias and demand characteristics that could adversely
impact multiple instances of behaviors. For example, what are
the sources of individual differences between Homo economi-
cus and quasi-Homo economicus groups? These authors spec-
ulated that these groups differed in rationality and cognitive
control capacity. The neural trait approach could probe whether
Homo economicus and quasi-Homo economicus demonstrate
differences in resting-state activity or structure in the lateral
PFC, importantly, without adulterating the multiple instances of
behaviors.
SELF-CONTROL IN SOCIAL DECISION-MAKING
Self-control is commonly implicated in many social behaviors.
Self-control is the process in which thoughts, emotions, or pre-
potent responses are inhibited to efficiently enact a focal goal.
Self-control is thus used to resolve conflicts between competing
motives, and most economic games invoke such a conflict as
prosocial behaviors often carry pecuniary sacrifice. However,
there is an ongoing debate about which kind of behavior is
prepotent—selfish or prosocial behavior—and, as a result, which
behavior requires self-control to implement. On the one hand, the
classic assumption has been that selfish desires are automatic or
primary impulses and prosocial desires are secondary, requiring
self-control to implement. This assumption has been reliably
affirmed in past work (van’t Wout et al., 2005; Knoch et al., 2006,
2010; for a review, see Knoch and Nash, 2015) and contemporary
evidence continues to mount in favor of prepotent selfishness.
For example, Strang et al. (2014) experimentally decreased left
and right lateral PFC activity in a within-subjects design and had
participants act as the proposer in two conditions of the dictator
game; a condition with no punishment and a condition in which
the responder may punish the proposer (similar to an ultimatum
game). Results showed that only disruption of the right lateral
PFC caused a reduction in the strategic shift from lower offers in
the no-punishment condition to higher offers in the punishment
condition. In a separate study, Ruff et al. (2013) similarly had
participants play as the proposer in a dictator and ultimatum
game and manipulated right lateral PFC activity, though activity
was either increased or decreased in a between-subjects design.
Results showed that increased right lateral PFC activity caused
an increased strategic shift in offers in the ultimatum game from
the dictator game, whereas decreased right lateral PFC-activity
caused a reduction in this strategic shift, as compared to a sham
activation control group. Together, these results support the idea
that the lateral PFC plays a causal role in the implementation of
norm compliant behavior and, more appositely, support the view
that prosocial behavior requires self-control.
On the other hand, researchers have found evidence con-
trary to this classic assumption—i.e., prosocial impulses are
primary and require no self-control to act upon. For exam-
ple, Rand et al. (2012) found that more automatic or intuitive
processing led participants to behave more prosocially across a
range of social decisions (Rand et al., 2012). An fMRI study
demonstrated that accepting, and not rejecting, unfair offers in
the ultimatum game involves the lateral PFC, suggesting that
the lateral PFC was involved in controlling automatic proso-
cial impulses to enact the selfish choice of keeping money
(Tabibnia et al., 2008). Finally, a number of studies have found
that prosocial behavior involves reward-related brain regions
and does not involve the self-control-related lateral PFC (for
a review, see Zaki and Mitchell, 2013). These studies thus
evidence that prosocial behaviors can also be “impulsive” or
intuitive.
These competing results demonstrate that the current debate
could benefit from an integrative perspective. It appears that
there is no one impulse that is universally prepotent or “default”;
rather prosocial and selfish desires can both be prepotent. What
determines a person’s prepotent impulse is personality and the
environment. This position aligns with classic psychological prin-
ciples (e.g., Lewin (1946) famously elegant equation, B[behavior]
= P[personality] × E[environment]) and hews closer to Occam’s
razor as the need to posit some universal, chronically prepotent
impulse is obviated. Further, this view aligns well with contem-
porary theorizing on prosocial behavior. For example, Declerck
et al. (2013) outlined a neuropsychological model of coopera-
tion to demonstrate that selfish and prosocial “rationales” for
cooperative behavior need not be contradictory if we recognize
that the brain can implement both types of cooperation. In this
model, other-regarding and self-regarding preferences, identified
as “individual inclinations”, interact with “contextual influences”
(i.e., “E”, situational or cultural factors; Herrmann et al., 2008;
Izuma, 2012) to moderate neural and psychological processes in
cooperative decision-making and behavior. To enact cooperative
behavior, people with self-regarding preferences require extrinsic
incentives for context-specific cooperation. Overcoming selfish
motives and implementing prosocial behavior, for those with self-
regarding preferences, requires cognitive control via the lateral
PFC (for supportive experimental evidence, see Emonds et al.,
2011).
Neural traits could figure prominently in investigating a
neuropsychological model of social preferences and contextual
influences. For example, one could first measure neural traits
and then measure neural activation during the social behav-
ior. “Offline” psychological capacity, as revealed by the neural
trait, should thus relate to “online” functioning during decision-
making processes or behavior, perhaps moderated by contextual
influences. As an illustration of this, recall the study described
above in which resting-state activation in the lateral PFC helped
explain individual differences in costly punishment behavior
(Knoch et al., 2010). Theoretically, resting-state activation in the
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lateral PFC could be positively associated with online activation
in the lateral PFC and self-control during costly punishment
behavior, particularly in the presence of extrinsic incentives
for context-specific cooperation. On the other hand, it is also
possible that certain neural traits are associated with more
efficient use of certain brain areas or systems and could be
related to reduced rather than increased online activation in
respective brain regions. Such findings would cast an entirely
new light on research involving task-dependent activity. These
are intriguing open questions well-suited to the neural trait
approach.
CONCLUSION
We have outlined the ways in which neural traits may meet the
demands of a changing field of research currently shifting from
description towards explanation. Neural traits offer an objective,
stable measure to uncover sources of heterogeneity in social
preferences. In closing, we first wish to highlight a limitation.
Researchers should be aware that in relating decision-making
behavior to certain brain areas, there is an inclination to “guess”
at the psychological process that mediates the brain—behavior
link. Indeed, this potential was often discussed in this paper
as an advantage of the approach. To be clear, however, infer-
ring the psychological mechanism is more appropriate when a
brain region has been tightly linked to specific, germane func-
tioning. We reviewed several studies that attempted to provide
mechanistic evidence. Recall the impartiality research in which
Baumgartner et al. (2013b) found that perspective-taking pro-
cesses mediated the link between dorsomedial PFC volume and
impartiality. These results supported their inference that people
with increased volume in the dorsomedial PFC had improved
perspective-taking abilities and are able to employ this capacity
more equally for in and outgroup members, leading to reduced
bias. Future neural trait research should similarly probe both neu-
ral and psychological mechanisms that underlie the links between
neural traits and individual differences in social decision-making
behaviors.
We close by noting exciting potential applications. Though
neural traits are highly stable across time, they should not be
immutable. Indeed, certain techniques and/or experiences impart
enduring changes to neural structures and processes. For exam-
ple, techniques such as neurofeedback, meditation, or repeated
practice of skills have the capacity to increase cortical volume or
cortical baseline activity in specific brain regions (e.g., Lazar et al.,
2005; Takeuchi et al., 2010; Ghaziri et al., 2013). Thus, targeted
training manipulations of specific neural traits related to social
preferences might impart stable changes to social preferences and
self-control capacity. Finally, we focused on stable neural traits
in healthy adults. A rich area of investigation could consider
neural traits vis-à-vis a fuller perspective that included genetics,
development, hormones, physiology, etc. (e.g., Burnham, 2007;
Eisenegger et al., 2011). For example, the neural trait approach
can occupy a unique position in genetic research on social
preferences and decision-making. The intermediate phenotype
model views neural mechanisms as the intermediate stage through
which genes direct behavior (Meyer-Lindenberg and Weinberger,
2006). Neural trait measures are ideal intermediate phenotypes
given that intermediate phenotypes are defined as stable and
heritable (e.g., Gianotti et al., 2012). Researchers could thus
probe unique gene→ trait→ relations in social preferences and
decision-making.
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